Lecture course "Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as devoid of theories"

Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as devoid of theories

20h lecture course, University of Uppsala, 7-11 September 2009

Dr. Oskari Kuusela (UEA, Norwich)

Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach, in both his early and later period, is informed by the view that there are no philosophical theories (theses or doctrines). Instead, he seeks to articulate a conception of philosophy as an activity of clarification of language use whose aim is to resolve philosophical problems. How exactly this approach is meant to lead to the resolution of philosophical problems, and what it means to philosophise without theses remain controversial issues, however. The goal of this course is to clarify these issues and thus Wittgenstein’s contribution to 20^th Century philosophy.

We will approach these topics through a discussion and comparison of the conceptions of philosophical clarification in Wittgenstein’s early and later work. This examination reveals that, despite his highly interesting attempt to abandon theses in his early Tractatus by making use of ideas of Herz, Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein relapses to theses about the nature of language and philosophy. Philosophical theses disguise themselves as methodology and take the form of a philosophical programme. Coming later on to comprehend the Tractatus’ failure, however, Wittgenstein seems able to develop a conception of philosophy as devoid of philosophical theses, and consequently free from theoretical presuppositions and philosophical hierarchies. His later philosophy is characterized by a novel conception of the status of philosophical statements and expressions of logical necessity, motivated by an aspiration to avoid dogmatism and injustice in philosophy.

An important question to be addressed in the course concerns the ‘nature’ of philosophical theses. Given that philosophical theses may take diverse forms, a clear comprehension what could be meant by such theses (especially an understanding of the role of modal notions in philosophical statements) is crucial for any attempt to abandon them. In this regard it may be argued that many interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy end up repeating the failure of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy in a new form. In order to make all this more concrete, I shall examine as exemplary topics Wittgenstein discussion of the concepts of meaning, language and necessity. The purpose is, on the one hand, to articulate an interpretation of Wittgenstein that avoids the problem of the relapse to theses. On the other hand, the purpose is to provide illustrative examples of what philosophising without theses amounts to and the advantages of such an approach.

Along the way, we’ll try to keep an eye on Carnap, the ethics of it all, do therapy only on ourselves, and hopefully have a good time.

A reading list will be provided.

Oskari Kuusela is Lecturer in Philosophy at the School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia. He is the author of The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy (Harvard UP, 2008), and the co-editor of Wittgenstein’s Interpreters (Blackwell, 2007) and The Wittgenstein Handbook (Oxford UP, forthcoming).

For registration and practical information about the course, accommodation possibilities in Uppsala, etc., contact  course administrator Niklas Forsberg niklas.forsberg@filosofi.uu.se