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PhD course Åbo (Moyal-Sharrock): Therapy is not enough: Wittgenstein's substantial contributions to philosophy
Postgraduate Course: Therapy is not enough - Wittgenstein's substantial contributions to philosophy Dr Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (University of Hertfordshire, UK) Finnish Graduate School of Philosophy, Åbo Akademi University Philosophy Department Monday 24 – Friday 28 May 2010
| What |
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|---|---|
| When |
May 24, 2010 03:00 PM
to May 28, 2010 12:00 PM |
| Where | Åbo Akademi Turku Finland |
| Contact Name | Martin Nybom |
| Contact Phone | +358 2 2154846 |
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Enrollment by April 31 2010: contact Martin Nybom mnybom(a)abo.fi. Anyone is invited to attend (but PhD-students will be given right of way). 5 ECTS for essay, 2 ECTS for active praticipation.
Course schedule
Monday 24 May 6pm Research Seminar, aud. Westermarck
Coming to Language: Wittgenstein's Social 'Theory' of Language Acquisition
Abstract: The two main problems of native language acquisition are: the problem of learning (explaining our grasp of the meaning of words); and the problem of productivity (explaining our ability to understand and produce novel, correct sentences, when the linguistic data we encounter is flawed and limited). Fodor’s and Chomsky's solution to these problems is to posit a mental linguistic structure (universal grammar or language of thought) as the framework that obviates the need for learning and makes an explanation of productivity possible. Ironically, Wittgenstein's solution is not as far removed from Fodor’s and Chomsky's as might be supposed. For, he too posits a framework at the basis of our language-games – indeed a partly grammatical framework which includes a universal grammar. But the commonality stops here, for Wittgenstein's universal grammar is neither innate nor inner; it is rooted in our primitive reactions and transmitted socio-culturally. Wittgenstein’s account of how we come to language can be counted as a social theory of language acquisition: it is in social practices, not in the mind, that we come to language.
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Monday 24 May (1 hour lecture + 1 hour discussion, from 3pm to 5pm, aud. Westermarck)
Wittgenstein's Hinges: Foundationalism in On Certainty
On Certainty is Wittgenstein's contribution to epistemology. If On Certainty can be said to be Wittgenstein's corrective of Moore, it can more meaningfully be seen as Wittgenstein's answer to Descartes – for the pivotal breakthrough of On Certainty is the realization that all our thinking and acting in the world is hinged on a framework of basic certainties that are not grounded on reason. In this lecture, I will elucidate the nature of basic beliefs or 'basic certainties': those 'hinges' on which Wittgenstein claims the door of knowledge turns.
Readings and presentation questions will be handed out
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Tuesday 25 May (1 hour lecture + 1 hour discussion, from 10am till noon, aud. Westermarck)
Wittgenstein & Psychological Certainty
As is well-known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the latter, unlike the former, involve observation or a claim to knowledge, and are therefore constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this lecture, I will challenge this asymmetry and the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and show that Wittgenstein ultimately also does. I will argue that, on Wittgenstein's view, we can – in some cases – be as non-cognitively and logically 'certain' about other people's emotions or sensations (e.g. 'She is afraid', 'He is in pain') as about our own ('I am afraid', 'I am in pain'). This also reinforces Wittgenstein's rebuttal of other mind scepticism.
afternoon: (15 minute introduction + 1 hour discussion, from 3pm till 5pm, aud. Westermarck)
Therapy is not enough: Wittgenstein's substantial contributions to philosophy
Whereas most philosophers have always understood Wittgenstein's method to be therapeutic in some limited sense, New Wittgensteinians have given that term an exclusively 'deconstructive' connotation and made the therapeutic method Wittgenstein's exclusive concern. I'll open the discussion by claiming that the therapeutic method is not, and was never purported to be, Wittgenstein's only or even preferred method of doing philosophy. I will suggest that – far from being a neutral bystander in the realm of philosophy – Wittgenstein not only formulates and applies theses, but is a fully-fledged theorist whose substantial contributions to philosophy, psychology, education theory etc. must now, after what I take to be an unfortunate lull, be recognized and applied.
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Wednesday 26 May (1 hour lecture + 1 hour discussion, from 10am till noon, aud. Westermarck)
Redefining the Boundary Between Language & Behaviour: Wittgenstein's 'speech-acts'
Nonverbal expressions have traditionally been categorized as deeds, verbal ones as language, regardless of function. Notable exceptions here are Adolf Reinach, Karl Bühler and J.L. Austin, but also Wittgenstein. In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein's contribution to redefining the boundary between language and behaviour according to use rather than form, particularly in his treatment of 'spontaneous utterances' of emotion and sensation as speech-acts. It is here – at the level of the spontaneous utterance of emotion – that the categories of speaking and acting basically converge; and, here then, that we must begin rethinking the mind-body problem.
afternoon: 2 hours student presentations on On Certainty (from 3pm till 5 pm, aud. Westermarck)
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Thursday 27 May (1 hour lecture + 1 hour discussion, from 10am till noon, aud. Westermarck)
Wittgenstein's Contribution to the Memory Debate
In this lecture, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein’s elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners.
afternoon: 2 hours student presentations on W's philosophy of psychology (from 3pm till 5pm, aud. Westermarck)
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Friday 28 May
2 hours student presentations on W's philosophy of language (from 10am till noon, aud. Westermarck)
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= approx. 15 hours + research seminar
